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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Poultry sectors’ domestic support and trade protection, or assistance, influences the 
way they develop, in particular their structure, trade, investments, and aspects of 
disease risk. Nominal Rates of Assistance (NRAs) measuring adjusted gaps between 
international and domestic prices were used in analysis of relationships between these 
factors. Structural data took the form of average chickens per holding as well as the 
predominant FAO Sector (I Industrial - IV Traditional). General “bird flu” incidence 
was obtained from an official website. Assistance constrains efficient trade, 
encourages smuggling/informal trade, diminishing the incentives for good 
management, leading to greater disease risk. It also constrains efficient investment, 
leading to greater disease risk through weaker SPS, research and other relevant 
institutions. Assistance can also constrain structural change, hindering development of 
efficient industrial production systems, or maintaining larger traditional sectors, 
resulting in greater disease risks. 
 
The research illustrates that “true” (unassisted) exporters tended to have low NRAs 
and “true” importers high NRAs. Negligible trading countries mainly had low NRAs 
apart from those with strong self-sufficiency policies. Structurally, all countries 
experienced concentration with relative growth in industrial sector holdings. The 
NRA and structure scatter plot illustrated that the “true” exporters and “true” 
importers fell into two groups of mixed structures; low (high) NRAs, more (lower) 
market incentives and lower (higher) HPAI incidences. HPAI experiences also 
appeared to be regionally based. 
 
A clear conclusion is that assistance does not determine structure – some countries 
had strong enough political economy objectives to be willing to pay the high cost of 
over-riding open market forces on their structures. However, assistance did determine 
whether structures were distorted and not economically efficient. Technically efficient 
developed structures in conjunction with (export) market incentives driving economic 
efficiency and encouraging better risk management, appear to positively impact on 
HPAI risk. High assistance levels hinder open markets’ role in the demise of 
inefficient, poorly managed productions systems, whether they be traditional or not, 
and creates greater disease risk. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The incomes and populations growth in developing countries, especially in urban areas, 
has created strong demand for livestock products. Supply responses to this growing 
demand have largely been in terms of an expansion of poultry production. This is because 
many countries can rapidly take up poultry production which has few religious/cultural 
concerns and has been able to maintain relatively lower prices through structural changes. 
These structural changes have been driven by aspects such as relatively transferable 
technological developments that ensure an efficient/economical conversion of grains to 
animal protein as well as concerns with disease controls. There is a variety of production 
systems from backyard, commercial to industrial with varying levels of bio-security, 
market outputs (exports, urban, rural), etc, with the industrial system taking up most of 
the growth. Impacts of these rapid poultry sector changes on aspects such as poverty 
alleviation and the environment are being studied. However, the impact of these on 
control of diseases has received relatively little attention.  
 
Some initial research suggests that domestic support and trade protection (both positive 
and negative) of national poultry sectors influences the way it develops, in particular its 
structure, trade and investments in different components of the industrial poultry chain. It 
is felt, based on indications from recent HPAI epidemics, that some of these influences 
could impede a country’s ability to prevent and control contagious diseases.  
 
To test the hypotheses, especially the extent poultry sector development characteristics 
like structure are influenced by protectionist policies, will require quantitative measures 
of protection for the poultry sector. A sample of countries from each of the following 
categories will be selected, data collected and analysed:  
- strong exporters (>10% of national production) of poultry products (generic stock 
& food products)(probable examples, the US, Brazil, Thailand and  Netherlands); 
- strong importers (>10% of national consumption) of poultry products (generic 
stock & food products)(probable examples being Caribbean countries); and 
- negligible exports and imports (<2% of national production and consumption 
respectively) of poultry products (generic stock & food products)(probable 
examples being Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Nigeria and China).  
There are sub-categories within these categories, for example the strong exporters and 
importers are made up of a mix of developed and developing countries, and a number of 
countries within the negligible exports and imports category are major producers and 
consumers but their trade has been constrained by self-sufficiency policies. Some 
                                                 
1 The author acknowledges support and feedback from the FAO in preparing and presenting a report based 
around this subject as input to the forthcoming State of Agriculture Report on “Livestock at the Turning 
Point” on which this study draws. 
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countries not falling into these categories are still major exporters or importers in quantity 
terms, even though their self-sufficiency ratios do not vary much away from 100% and an 
example of such countries will be included in the sample. The sample will also have 
coverage of countries that have and have not been able to prevent and control HPAI. 
 
2. Relevant data collected 
 
From the introductory discussion, there are a number of secondary data that may be 
required for each country over time (e.g. over the last 10 years) for the analysis: 
- poultry sector structure and structural changes 
- poultry production and consumption 
- poultry trade and investment 
- poultry industry input subsidies including feed 
- poultry product and generic stock import tariffs 
- public investments on poultry production and processing research and extension 
- subsidies on poultry services – technical and management systems 
- subsidies on the promotion of poultry products, nationally and internationally 
- export subsidies 
- poultry and poultry product export taxes 
- Sanitary and Physo-Sanitary (SPS)-measures; and 
- aggregate protection coefficients (e.g. OECD Producer and Consumer Subsidy 
Equivalents (PSEs and CSEs respectively – known as Support Estimates) and 
WTO Aggregate Measurements of Support (AMS)) 
 
Ratios of poultry exports to production, and imports to consumption, are required to 
classify countries into strong (or large) exporters, strong (or large) importers, and 
negligible exports and imports. Spreadsheet data provided by the Trade and Markets 
Division (EST), FAO contained these ratios for poultry meat (trade in livestock is 
relatively much smaller) from 1981 to 2006 for a large number of individual countries, 
though the European Union (EU) is presented without a breakdown of individual 
members (individual EU country information was obtained from FAOSTAT). 
 
There were more strong importers than strong exporters with the number of countries 
with negligible exports and imports lying between. Some countries like Togo, Canada, 
Hong Kong, Oman, UAE, Bulgaria, Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, Croatia, Slovenia, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Belarus were both strong exporters and importers in 2006 
and will not be considered for the cross-sectional analysis that needs to separate these 
aspects. Probable examples mentioned above that did not fall into their nominated 
categories included Vietnam (2%<imports<10%), Egypt (2%<imports<10%) and China 
(2%<imports & exports<10%). Egypt and Vietnam have only fallen out in recent years 
(illustrating the extent of growth in the sector) and could be included in their nominated 
category on the basis of their situation over the majority of the 10-year period. China is a 
large exporter and importer in quantity terms (with imports generally higher than exports 
over the last 10 years except in two of the last 3 years collected, again illustrating the 
degree of growth) and will be included in the sample on this basis. 
 
4
Poultry protection coefficients 
There are a number of possible consistently-derived aggregate protection coefficients that 
could be used in the analysis, such as the OECD’s PSEs/CSEs (see www.oecd.org), 
WTO’s AMS (see www.wto.org) and the Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) recently 
developed in the World Bank’s “Distortions to Agricultural Incentives” project (see 
www.worldbank.org/agdistortions and Anderson 2009). Aggregate measures are 
generally used as they are what is negotiated in the WTO and analysed, not individual 
measures like tariffs (especially bound rather than applied tariffs) that can be swamped 
by more significant trade impediments such as non-tariff barriers (NTBs), and on their 
own can give a false measure of sector level protection.  
 
Individual measures are available for some countries (see Mehta 2003 for domestic 
support (values or prices) and export subsidies of poultry products obtained from 
notifications for selected WTO-member countries and years). Some individual measures 
are less significant representations of protection than others. For example, public 
investment on developing country research is available from ASTI (see 
www.asti.cgiar.org though poultry-related research is difficult to identify, dated and 
sparse) but would appear small relative to other individual measures like tariffs and input 
subsidies. There is also a question over its protection characteristics with some arguing 
that subsidies in this area are addressing a public-good market failure that results in 
under-investment in such research, the benefits of which spillover to the international 
community. Market price support (MPS) tends to dominate protection policies, 
increasingly in developing countries where budget funds for direct payments are scarce, 
and in conjunction with input subsidies (OECD 2007). Measures of MPS are available for 
poultry for Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, EU, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Switzerland, Turkey and the US.  
 
Some of the individual measures of protection may have stronger relationships with 
trade, investment and structural impacts, and subsequently with impeded prevention and 
control of contagious diseases. The most obvious possibility of this would be differential 
import tariffs between generic stock and poultry product. A US Economic Research 
Services (ERS) spreadsheet of applied tariffs was used in conjunction with data on live-
trade also provided by EST FAO to draw out some information on this aspect. The main 
live traders are US-Canada, EU-Eastern Europe, Hong Kong-China, Singapore-Malaysia 
and Egypt, not unanimously countries most associated with contagious disease breakouts, 
pointing to the fact that just small numbers such as might occur through smuggling, 
informal uncontrolled trade and wild birds could be responsible for such outbreaks, 
especially in unprepared systems. In terms of tariffs, these cascade with processing, for 
example Egypt has 5% applied on live and 32% on processed, China 10% and 20%, and 
US 2c/kg and 18c/kg (Canada and EU were too complex to summarize) though countries 
like the US generally have stronger SPS-type regulations. 
 
The aggregate measures are related but each has its own advantages and disadvantages. 
Deficiencies in AMS are well described in FAO (2006) where it is pointed out that they 
are just the basis of legal commitments to reduce some trade distorting support in the 
WTO Agreement on Agriculture. Unlike the PSE, the AMS “is not a useful economic 
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tool to understand the degree and impact of distortions in agriculture” (Orden et al 2007) 
as is required in this analysis. AMS has a base period of 1986-88 whereas the PSE uses 
actual producer and border prices in a given year to provide a measure of total support to 
producers based on annual monetary transfers through policy measures (market price 
support, budgetary payments and budget revenue foregone). AMS only covers domestic 
support policies that are in the Amber Box, and unlike PSEs, excludes production-
limiting policies (Blue Box), minimally trade-distorting policies (Green Box) and de 
minimis level of trade-distorting policies (FAO 2006).  
 
The PSEs exclude agricultural research and extension but include some other more 
controversial general service expenditures like insurance schemes, environmental 
payments and some regional development expenditures (Orden et al 2007). Orden et al 
(2007) provided some other critiques of PSEs, which they use in their analysis of China, 
India, Indonesia and Vietnam, in two main categories of 1.) assumptions underlying the 
concept (e.g. independence between domestic and international prices, and the perfect 
substitution of domestic and international goods) and 2.) its interpretation (e.g. directly 
capturing the trade effect of agricultural policies, representing producer surplus, and 
whether farmers or others capture the benefits). Similar critiques are provided in Cahill 
and Legg (1990), and OECD (2007). Cahill and Legg (1990) compare PSEs with 
alternative measures of assistance such as NRAs (the difference between the “output 
incentive price” and the world price which accounts for all policies that raise prices 
received by domestic producers) and effective rates (ERs) which include border 
protection and assistance on inputs.  
 
Anderson et al (2006) put forward a form of NRAs (the percentage distortion to the gross 
price of farm products) that attribute price distortion estimates for each farm and lightly 
processed product (e.g. milk and sugar) to specific border or domestic policy measures 
(e.g. tariffs and import taxes) after adjustments for transport, margins and quality. The 
components can be used in economic models that estimate policy impacts on social 
welfare etc. To collect long time-series for a wide range of countries with different 
complexities and data qualities requires such a simple indicator. The measures of 
distortion using NRAs, though strongly related, differ from the PSEs which are expressed 
as a fraction of the distorted value and are always smaller than NRAs.  
 
PSEs are stated by Cahill and Legg (1990) to be “straightforward, easily understood and 
feasible” measures of (nominal) agricultural assistance required by policy makers. ERs 
may be a better indicator of the incentive effects of all relevant policies but the market-
price support aspects of PSEs provide a good guide to the level of price distortion. 
Moreover, PSEs do not have the same substantial data demands facing ERs which is why 
relatively few have been estimated. ERs were not estimated in World Bank (2006) as this 
would have required each product’s rarely available value-added share of output. In most 
developing countries, the value and distortions to farm inputs are relatively small 
compared to those applying to outputs. When these input distortions were significant, 
they were taken into account by calculating a NRA for these inputs and adding this to the 
NRA for output to obtain a total nominal rate of assistance to farm production. 
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Another important aspect in the choice of suitable measures such as NRAs and PSEs is 
data availability. Tangerman (2005) stated that PSEs were “the only available source of 
internationally comparable information on support levels in agriculture”. Some 
comprehensive databases such as that developed in the GTAP model 
(https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu) only measure tariffs, not NTBs and export taxes. 
Since 2005, however, the World Bank project on “Distortions to Agricultural Incentives” 
has developed a comprehensive collection of data on the distorting impacts of agricultural 
support and protection (World Bank 2006). It provides long time-series of measures such 
as NRAs for a large number of countries, especially developing countries for which such 
measures are relatively rarer, across all regions of the world. But there is generally a 
trade-off between such comprehensiveness and detailed component measures of domestic 
support and trade protection. It is more comprehensive than the OECD data on PSEs etc 
which only provides information for a few developing countries but at a broad level of 
component detail, for example commodity MPS which are sometimes needed to properly 
reflect changes in agricultural policy reforms masked in aggregate measures (Tangerman 
2005). Some other collections like the WTO Trade Policy Reviews may have more 
detailed descriptive information that could be also used to reflect policy reforms but these 
are only available for intermittent years. The appendix Table A1 lists the countries 
covered in the more comprehensive World Bank (2006) and the OECD databases that fall 
within the required categories. Top world rankings of live (L) and processed exports and 
imports are noted in brackets. India does not rank as a top exporter or importer because of 
a strong self-sufficiency policy, also applied by Indonesia and Korea (Dem.), but is 
ranked in the top 10 world production and consumption. Many of the negligible exports 
and imports countries had no poultry NRA details, reflecting poultry’s relative 
insignificance in these countries’ overall agricultural production.  
 
Limitations on the existing protection data were outlined in the above discussion and 
included country coverage; the detail of the component measures that could be useful in 
determining what were the real impacts of policy changes; “effective rates” that fully take 
into account distortions to inputs; and accuracy (as is evident from the two NRA 
estimates for South Africa given in Table A2). These limitations are not critical to 
analysis being able to be undertaken on the hypotheses of interest.  
 
Poultry structural change 
Other key data, such as details on structural change, are not as readily or consistently 
available as is the protection data. The table from Narrod et al (2007) under Thailand in 
the Appendix, which shows an increase in large and a decrease in small poultry farms 
over 1988 to 2003, illustrates the extent of data that can be available. Econometric 
measures of such changes in structure based on the structural distributions could be 
developed. If such detailed structural distributions are not available, then (point trends of) 
distributional averages (e.g. chickens or meat/eggs production per production unit) could 
be used (the FAO website is a predominant source of summaries of most countries’ 
Agricultural Censuses which generally have some details on poultry holdings and bird 
numbers – see Table A3 for details). These measures link to some productivity measures 
and could be considered a representation of outputs in respect of management or 
technology inputs. Other possible proxies, when structural averages are not sufficient, 
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include dummy variables for the predominant structure of production systems (e.g. 
classification such as the predominance of FAO’s Sectors I-IV2 over (sub) periods)).  
 
The interest in the structural data is to ascertain if there are consistent relationships 
between protection and structure (in its own right and as an intermediate to analyzing 
relationships between protection and disease risk). Broad data is probably most relevant 
here (e.g. low and high protection’s association with a competitive, predominantly Sector 
I production system) as it is most unlikely there will be linear-type relationships such as 
NRAs change on average by x percent for each marginal chicken per holding.  
 
The data being sought, given the general non-availability of structural distributions for 
many countries, are the structural averages. Such information, though somewhat dated is 
most readily available, hopefully on a reasonably consistent basis, from the FAO website. 
Separately listed census summaries were the main sources used from the website but on 
occasions more up-to-date or detailed information was available from listed linked 
websites, often the country’s agriculture ministry or its statistics agency.  
 
Although some components of the poultry industry are heavily traded (e.g. commercial 
poultry meats), others are not (e.g. native chickens). It might be argued that a relationship 
involving protection measures should be restricted to the structure of traded components 
but the broader relationship includes disease risk and there are strong interconnections 
between the flocks of the various components, especially the traditional sector, and even 
wild flocks, in this regard. Therefore it is more appropriate for the full purposes of this 
research to include in the relationships the structure of the countries’ overall poultry 
industries. However, the structural averages are an aggregate of quite different 
components, for example less technically efficient traditional sectors that often survive by 
drawing price premiums, a bit along the lines of organic and some other less technically 
developed products. A focus on the traded broiler sector would change the structural 
averages but generally not the ordering of the countries – exporters averages would most 
likely change most, followed by importers (apart from perhaps Russia whose overall 
industry focus has been on an import-competing industrial sector) and then the others. 
 
Another issue is whether a time series matching the protection data would be useful or 
whether just a trend or even a single average (which relate to intermittent censuses for 
different years and for different countries) would suffice. In descriptions in Appendix 1, 
countries that had several relevant censuses around the analysis period illustrated that 
there was generally no significant change in the structural averages – those that were 
predominantly Sector I-type production systems, etc remained so over the 10-year period. 
If background material suggested this was not the case, as it might with a fast growing 
developing country, then time sensitive measures of the changes in the structure were 
derived.  
 
                                                 
2 Sector I intensive, large-scale, industrial poultry production (high bio-security); Sector II semi-intensive, 
medium-scale, commercial poultry production (moderate to high bio-security); Sector III semi-commercial, 
small-scale poultry production usually for live bird markets (low to minimal bio-security); and Sector IV  
traditional extensive backyard production consumed locally (minimal bio-security). 
8
Some countries did not have any censuses listed (e.g. Russia) and others had minimal 
information (e.g. Indonesia just total heads of chicken). Here, other information was used 
to derive the required structural averages with details of this documented in an appendix.  
 
SPS and other relevant poultry information  
Some SPS-measures are said to address externalities associated with disease importation 
and care is required to separate those that are distortions from those that are appropriate 
market intervention measures (Anderson et al 2006). A measures that is so costly to 
consumers relative to disease prevention benefits for import-competing producers would 
not appear appropriate, as national welfare would be improved by their removal (James 
and Anderson 1998). Regardless of the underlying intent of the SPS-measures, in terms 
of the analysis in this project the effect could be the same – isolating the domestic 
industry from foreign competition that could influence structural development and its 
impact on a country’s ability to prevent and control contagious diseases.  
 
The effect of any distortionary impacts of SPS-measures can be captured in the estimated 
gap between domestic and international prices, adjusted for non-distortionary aspects 
such as quality differences, margins, transport costs etc. There are two basic approaches 
to measuring impediments, direct measures of specific impediments that could miss less 
transparent ones or adjusting the gap for known non-protection effects such as quality 
differences as are used here (Trewin et al 1995). SPS-measures tend to have selective 
bilateral effects. For example, the US bans Brazil poultry products but other competition 
keeps its NRAs low with adjusted domestic prices around international prices (with 
Brazil moving its product to other markets where it often out-competes the US). Thus it is 
unlikely that adjustments need to be made to the gap for SPS-measures unless they are 
applied universally and are non-distortionary.  
 
The following Peterson and Orden (2005) table on bilateral SPS-barriers to poultry trade 
would require expansion to cover all potential sample countries (currently Thailand 
imports are banned by the EU and Japan, and Mexico bans imports from some US states) 
and updating (e.g. Russia now does not allow some EU imports, and Japan the same with 
China imports) if it was to be used in the analysis but it does illustrate the extent of SPS-
measures, including in South-South trade.  
 
 Importers 
Exporters US  Brazil EU China Japan Russia 
US - Banned Banned Allowed Allowed Allowed 
Brazil Banned - Allowed Allowed Allowed Allowed 
EU Allowed Allowed - Allowed Allowed Allowed 
China Banned Banned Banned - Allowed Allowed 
 
Petersen and Orden (2005) concluded that global trade would expand by more than 25% 
if non-technical barriers were removed by major importers, and even more with the 
removal of SPS-barriers (primarily US access to the EU).  
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Other key information required for a fuller analysis is that on a country’s ability to 
prevent and control contagious diseases. Broad information on this aspect, much of it 
becoming evident in research that was reviewed for the key hypotheses of this research, 
was collected to assist in preliminary development of the broader hypotheses 
incorporating disease elements. For example, it was mentioned in one reviewed research 
report that EU HPAI outbreaks tended to be in non-commercial flocks or from wild birds. 
Information on official reports of outbreaks of notifiable poultry diseases is available on 
the OIE website (www.oie.int).  
 
When available for the countries concerned, other relevant information can be provided 
from agricultural policy information held by the OECD (e.g. Nominal Protection 
Coefficients (NPCs) in OECD 2007) and other agencies such as WTO Trade Policy 
Reviews and country notifications, and USDA FAS GAIN reports. 
 
3. Poultry protection coefficients and steps taken to derive them 
 
From the above it can be appreciated that the NRA estimates from World Bank (2006) 
are the most appropriate, mainly on the basis of their comprehensive country coverage.  
 
In terms of the sample choice, the following countries were suggested by the FAO with 
brief FAO HPAI assessments in brackets (these differed on occasions from the latest OIE 
listings, for example Japan and Russia were listed as having HPAI incidents over 2008): 
 
Strong exporters: 
- Brazil (never had HPAI) 
- EU (quickly eradicated outbreaks of HPAI in some member countries) 
- Thailand (several waves of HPAI) 
- US (has had LPAI but not HPAI) 
 
Strong importers: 
- Japan (no HPAI) 
- Mexico (no HPAI) 
- Russian Federation (no HPAI) 
 
Negligible exports/imports: 
- Egypt (endemic HPAI) 
- Indonesia (endemic HPAI) 
- Vietnam (endemic HPAI) 
 
Not categorized: 
- China (endemic HPAI in some parts) 
 
China, which was suggested on the basis of its large poultry production, was added to the 
strong importers category because of similar treatment in World Bank (2006) of countries 
like China that had significant trade year-after-year even though their self-sufficiency 
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ratio was never significantly (>10%) away from 100%, and because the majority of its 
poultry trade over the last 10 years resulted in net imports.  
 
Added (negligible exports/imports) sample: 
- Ecuador 
 
Adding Ecuador, who has never had HPAI, along with China to the strong importers 
category, ensured a mix of HPAI experiences across categories. The final sample also has 
a mix of developed and developing countries amongst the strong exporters and importers 
with all the main exporters and importers included. The negligible exports/imports 
sample is made up of only developing countries, which might be expected to dominate 
this category given their developing trade, and covers the main developing country 
regions. Korea (Dem.), a developing country with HPAI, fell into the negligible 
exports/imports category because of its strong self-sufficiency policy, like Japan but more 
“successfully”, and will enter some analysis using a broader sample of NRAs. 
 
It was decided to treat the EU in terms of its individual member countries that had 
reported poultry NRAs in World Bank (2006) (no estimates were provided for some 
small members like Luxemburg) because of the evolution of its membership over the 
analysis period and some early period differences in some NRAs and other aspects like 
structure that had the potential for misleading aggregation effects. In broad terms, 
Germany, Sweden and the UK are major importers; France is a major exporter; and the 
Netherlands is both a major importer (re-exporter) and exporter. The other members with 
reported NRAs are Austria, Denmark, Italy, Ireland, Finland, Portugal and Spain. 
 
The only country in the sample for which chicken meat NRAs were not estimated in 
World Bank (2006) was Egypt. These were derived on a consistent basis to the other 
Egyptian commodity NRAs that were estimated. This involved calculating the difference 
between domestic prices (from FAOSTAT) and international prices (from Georgia Dock 
weighted average wholesale price, ready to cook, presented in the Poultry News Report, 
Agricultural Marketing Service, USDA, plus a 25% transport margin).  
 
Table A2 contains the NRAs collected and derived following the steps just described. 
 
A potential element of protection that is not necessarily picked up appropriately in the 
protection coefficients concerns SPS-measures when these are universal and aimed at 
distorting agricultural trade flows rather than addressing some externalities associated 
with disease risk. However, in the hypotheses of interest in this project, any measure that 
distorts trade flows and effects structures etc, whether it is aimed at doing so or 
addressing externalities, is of interest. For this reason, SPS-measures will be dealt with in 
the later more general section on protection, structure, and infectious disease risks.  
 
4. Descriptions of the patterns of poultry protection 
 
From Table A2, strong exporters have mainly low but some high NRAs (with some 
consistency within regions). Strong importers have mainly high but some low NRAs 
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(again generally consistent in regions). Countries with negligible exports/imports are a 
mix of the extremes of low or high NRAs in line with the country’s overall level of 
agricultural assistance. These patterns are evident from Figure 1 showing the sample 
NRAs over time within groupings of exporters, importers and others, especially when the 
EU and China are reclassified on the basis of analysis in World Bank (2006)(note scale 
changes in the various figures). In World Bank (2006), EU poultry is classified as an 
importable even though there are significant net exports as it has been judged that its 
trade status has been reversed by policy distortions such as a prohibitive import tariffs 
plus societal preferences for some production methods that add to costs (see Anderson et 
al 2006). China has changed from being a net importer at the start of the 10-year analysis 
period to an exporter for the last 3 years and poultry is classified as an exportable in 
World Bank (2006). With the negligible exports/imports shown in Table A2, Indonesia 
and Korea are the odd ones out amongst a group of developing countries that have 
lowering NRAs, having undertaken reforms and, in the case of Vietnam, acceded to the 
WTO. Indonesia and Korea have strong self-sufficiency policies that have been supported 
by border protection and input subsidies.  
 
Figure 1: NRAs over time (1993-2003) 
NRA's of Exporter Countries, 1993 - 2003
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NRA's of Importer Countries, 1993-2003
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NRA's  of Negligible Exporters/ Importers, 1993-2003
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5. Preliminary analysis/commentary on protection impact on trade and investment 
 
Figure 2 shows that true “exporters” had low NRAs, and “true” importers high NRAs.  
 
Figure 2: NRAs over time (1993-2003) 
NRA's of "Exporter" Countries, 1993 - 2003
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NRA's of "Importer" Countries, 1993-2003
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As reflected in the EU being reclassified as an importer on the basis of the World Bank’s 
analysis, if the Doha Round was implemented then the EU would have to cut tariffs, 
eliminate export subsidies and reduce trade-distorting domestic support which would 
significantly affect current trade flows and improve the economic welfare of both the EU 
and those countries that become new or greater exporters. These impacts of protection 
constraining trade are well understood but with poultry trade there is greater scope for 
applying protection through SPS-type measures. High NRAs are often associated with 
high income countries who can afford the high costs of protecting import-competing 
industries and this is the situation with the EU (including via direct payments), Japan and 
Korea but the US, an exporter, has low poultry NRAs. The opposite is often the case with 
low NRAs and more dynamic exporting developing countries like Brazil, China, and 
Thailand, as well as Vietnam, fitting this situation but Indonesia and Russia with strong 
self-sufficiency policies not. 
 
Indonesia can be used as an example of the inappropriateness of some self-sufficiency 
approaches like which it re-introduced for rice following a period of open-trade under the 
IMF rescue package when it raised domestic prices over international prices and imposed 
import bans to try to achieve self-sufficiency by protecting and assisting domestic 
producers with some compensation for poor consumers (Warr 2005). The poor would 
have been better off with Indonesia staying open to the most efficient producers in the 
world (Thailand continued to export in the recent high-price environment) and 
subsidising food rather than domestic food production (as in the Philippines). (The case 
of subsidies being useful in the uptake of new technologies that increase production to 
new levels is well gone.) Indonesia would have probably gone close to achieving efficient 
self-sufficiency if they let high international prices flow through to the domestic market 
rather than banning exports in trying to clear the domestic market at a price below high 
international levels. This action of trying to force self-sufficiency would assist domestic 
consumers who will be encouraged to consume more than otherwise. Input subsidies 
aimed at compensating farmers for higher input prices and lower output prices, might 
induce some additional production than would be produced otherwise. With higher world 
prices closed out of the domestic market, hoarding of stocks and smuggling of rice out 
will occur (previously stocks were lowered and rice was smuggled in), and if they 
compensate producers through input subsidies, even in the short-term, these inputs will 
be smuggled out as well. Subsidising inputs, that has led to excessive use and 
environmental problems in the past, can crowd out any private enterprises in this area, 
and affect other non-rice production. Incentives for increasing production to what it 
would be under international prices will be diminished unless the full extent of the price 
differences are met by the subsidy. Subsidies were very expensive even at the old levels 
aimed mainly at encouraging the uptake of new technologies. Without the full subsidy, 
farmers may be better off producing other non-banned products or undertaking other 
activities. Closing the domestic market off from the international market not only makes 
Indonesia more vulnerable to weather situations but requires distorting the domestic 
market, losing benefits from better resource allocation and dynamic competitive forces. 
In the longer-term, investments in R&D and infrastructure, and more private sector 
involvement, will improve the efficiency of supplies on a more sustainable basis than 
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subsidies. Such policies were included along with more open trade and better market 
information in the “good” approaches laid out in IFPRI (2008). “Bad” approaches 
included trade bans/taxes and long-term input subsidies, the foundations of self-
sufficiency approaches. 
 
Spillovers from constraining trade can be complicated (e.g. protection may maintain a 
structure of relatively more smallholders which may be more vulnerable to contagious 
diseases unless other integrating approaches such as cooperatives and contracting are 
undertaken – initial responses to HPAI include immediate closing of free-range holdings 
that tend to be smaller than industrial structures and longer-term ones like moving 
traditional sectors out of urban areas). These complications will be dealt with later and 
just more direct relationships of protection on poultry trade and investment covered here. 
 
With investment, it was wrongly thought that protection might attract investment behind 
tariff walls etc. International companies look more to a transparent, coherent and 
consistent policy environment rather than to preferences when making investment 
decisions. Protection is seen as a sign of a conservative mindset and tends to discourage 
investment in a globalized world that relies on open trade and investment. Poultry is 
dependent on competitive international inputs such as feed and technologies based 
around industrial-type structures if it is to remain competitive, and globalization is 
important to obtain access to these aspects. Investment data across countries at a level 
like poultry are difficult to obtain. Databases like UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 
and WTO Trade Policy Reviews, at best, report consistently only on broad sectors like 
food and agriculture. Even at the specific country level like with Japan where ministries 
and JETRO provide detailed data on FDI, this is not at a specific sector-level apart from 
possibly in lists of significant investments (Drysdale et al 1999). 
 
Low NRA poultry exporting countries might expect high incoming investment but data to 
determine this is hard to find. The given FDI source can be misleading with much coming 
from haven countries such as the British Virgin Islands. Figures for Brazil only have 
incoming FDI, as might be expected given its developing status, and although this is 
provided in terms of farming of animals, the stock of FDI in this sub-category had no 
entries for many years. With the US there are entries in both incoming and outgoing FDI 
in this sub-category and interestingly, the incoming stock of FDI is greater than the 
outgoing stock, supporting the view that investors can learn much in terms of their own 
industries from investing in efficient overseas countries. Import-competing countries 
might be expected to have less incoming FDI for the above reasons but also so their own 
industries capture the implicit rents that are contained in high NRAs. Japan has no 
incoming FDI in the primary industry category and outgoing FDI is only given for the 
broad agriculture etc category. There appeared no useful FDI information for China and 
Thailand.  
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6. Comments on relationships between protection, structure and infectious diseases 
 
Poultry structure 
The key quantitative focus of the study concerns protection influencing the development 
of a sector’s structure, an aspect that was a strong intermediate element of the trade and 
investment impacts on disease risk. There has been a global trend in recent years towards 
large, international and highly vertically-integrated private poultry firms in most 
countries, especially some developing countries who production and exports have 
increased dramatically (e.g. in Thailand over 1988 to 2003, Narrod et al 2007). Small 
poultry farms still make up the majority of production in Less Developed Countries but 
the trend to larger poultry farms is still present. There are similar trends from live to more 
processed end-products being purchased by consumers. 
 
Specific details on each sampled country’s poultry industry structure are presented in 
Appendix 1. 
 
From even a casual observation of the countries’ data it can be appreciated that not all 
countries with significant efficient Sector I production systems will have the same broad 
level of NRAs. For example, exporters Brazil and the US have low NRAs (close to zero, 
though the US has more stringent SPS, anti-dumping and safeguard regimes that may 
need to be taken into account in terms of overall measures of protection) whilst the EU 
has high NRAs (averaging around 80% over the last 10 years, as well as stringent SPS, 
etc regimes) yet in terms of structural summaries, the EU falls between Brazil and the US 
in terms of chickens per holding. Obviously a bilateral relationship between the basic 
data is not capturing all relevant factors in terms of the hypothesized relationships. The 
EU is made up of a mix of countries and from the structural averages, the Netherlands 
and some others have predominantly Sector I production systems that compare favorably 
with the US in terms of technical efficiency but also a number have significant traditional 
sectors. Brazil has a large Sector I that can compete with the US on export markets but 
also larger other sectors, including traditional sectors, that can have a marked effect on 
the averages and aspects like disease risks. A FAO report on long-term farming trends 
using agricultural censuses (Anriquez et al 2007), had developing countries Brazil and 
Thailand with significant but relatively low shares of small farms compared to other 
developing countries (20% and 33% respectively). Brazil, the US, and to a lesser degree, 
Thailand, fit the usual scenario of competitive (predominantly Sector I) export industries 
being lightly protected. The EU is different in that it is highly protected but in World 
Bank (2006), EU poultry is classified as import competing.  
 
A common scenario for import-competing industries is that they are more highly-assisted 
or protected than export industries. This is the situation for the sample of importers apart 
from China which, as mentioned earlier, has changed from being an importer at the start 
of the 10-year analysis period to an exporter for the last 3 years, and poultry is classified 
as an exportable in World Bank (2006). The importers could have predominantly the 
more technically efficient Sector I production systems, especially if they can afford a 
strong self-sufficiency policy as is the case with Japan whose structural average is of a 
similar level to that of the developed country “exporter”, the EU. China and Mexico have 
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structural averages that lie between those of the developing country exporters, Thailand 
and Brazil (China’s share of small farms was estimated at 98% in Anriquez et al 2007). 
Russia is a developing country with a recent strong self-sufficiency policy (e.g. import 
quotas and duties, input subsidies and SPS controls) though its costs are causing some 
consumer tensions and its high NRAs will come under scrutiny in WTO accession 
negotiations. However, it has started to rapidly develop some agricultural industries since 
the 1990s, particularly poultry through new breeds, modern management etc. Although 
its initial estimated structural average (for agricultural enterprises which are a small 9% 
of poultry holdings but over 50% of output) in Appendix 1 is unrealistically high, it is 
still a reflection of such rapid development as described in various GAIN Reports. 
 
The “negligible trade” sample is made up of developing countries that are mainly lightly 
protected, having undertaken reforms and, in the case of Vietnam, acceded to the WTO. 
Indonesia, the odd one out, has a strong self-sufficiency policy that has been supported by 
border protection and input subsidies, and fits more the above importers. Structural 
averages are generally relatively low, of the same order as China and Mexico. Egypt’s 
structural average is the lowest of all the 12 countries sampled, having like a number of 
the other sampled developing countries, a very large traditional sector that had been 
supported by high levels of protection, now being brought down (Egypt’s share of small 
farms was estimated at 96% whilst Vietnam’s was 95% but Ecuador’s only 43% in 
Anriquez et al 2007). Indonesia’s estimated structural average is unrealistically high 
which reflects the limited treatment of the traditional sector in its estimation and has been 
proxied by Thailand’s earlier 1998 average. The high levels of protection have assistcd 
the maintenance of its very large traditional sector and their appropriate inclusion would 
lead to much lower estimate of its structural average than initially made. 
 
The following scatter diagram (with grid lines capturing broad groups along both axes) of 
the most recent structural average (the year average is around 1999-2000) and the 
average of NRAs (around the same year), illustrates the above discussion. Most recent 
structural averages of only in the 1990s for Mexico (1991) and Brazil (1996) are over 10 
years old and, given the dynamics of these countries poultry industries, current structural 
averages will be much higher (at least double) , although movement of their scatter points 
up the diagram (see arrows) will not affect their groupings. A cluster of low NRA 
countries have both predominant Sector I systems (e.g. US) and significant traditional 
sectors (e.g. Egypt and Vietnam)  but many of these are already developing towards 
predominantly Sector I systems with the incentives flowing from low NRAs and efficient 
exports (e.g. Brazil, Thailand plus China). This is not a development that necessarily 
involves the traditional producers moving up in scale to become part of the Sector I 
holdings, though arrangements like cooperatives and contracting can assist in this regard 
(see for example Trewin (2004) which mentions some Australian dairy cooperatives 
moving from a body of traditional producers to international dairy trading companies). 
High NRA countries again have a mix but the predominantly Sector I countries are 
dependent on the high assistance for their size (e.g. EU, Japan). Protection or assistance 
can be given in a form that will develop industries or not. Russia, a developing country, 
has a more predominant Sector I structure as a result of strong self-sufficiency policies. 
However, predominant traditional sector (developing) countries’ assistance can maintain 
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their predominant Sector IV structure whilst aiming for self-sufficiency (e.g. Indonesia). 
The main difference between this type of industry development and that mentioned in 
relation to the exporters is that the latter is economic efficient and the former is not. 
Mexico and especially Ecuador fall in between these two cases with their assistance 
coming down and their structures concentrating.  
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Spread of infectious poultry diseases 
A key question needed to be addressed in broader analysis is how do the structural 
impacts (bearing in mind trade, investment and other possible explanatory variables) 
correlate with the spread of contagious diseases? It is the relationship between protection 
and impeded prevention and control of contagious diseases that is a focus within the 
overall study, with the important structure-type impacts being intermediate to this key 
relationship. Information on these intermediate impacts could be replaced by proxy 
measures evident from the hypothesized relationships between protection, structure and 
impeded prevention and control of contagious diseases in a broader analysis.  
 
Apart from the structural impact mentioned above, there might be other reasons why 
protection could be associated with increased risks of HPAI. It might be thought 
increasing trade in live animals, even though this is generally between a few mainly non-
HPAI prevalent countries, could be one such risk. However, constraining trade gives an 
incentive for less controlled informal trade/smuggling which even in small numbers like 
with wild birds could be associated with increased risk of HPAI. Increasing trade in 
processed product could be associated with decreasing risk of HPAI for more than the 
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obvious reasons (e.g. allowing imports/exports might lead to more SPS-type and other 
relevant institutions, relevant research etc and more care in relation to HPAI aspects, all 
of which appear more cost-effective than border controls in keeping down HPAI impact 
costs – there may be no processing or exports due to higher input costs from distortions). 
A number of new relevant institutions were developed in Indonesia and other Asian 
countries following the Asian Financial Crisis, for example those related to competition 
policy that would affect structures. 
 
More SPS-type institutions etc could also apply to increased investment which would 
appear associated with decreasing risk of HPAI. In addition, investment would bring in 
large global private companies able to invest in HPAI research and with more awareness 
and private incentives to self-police HPAI seeing an outbreak would have more private 
costs and less public costs. This was the experience with contract poultry growing in 
eastern Indonesia where compensation for pre-emptive culling became part of the 
management system to maintain confidence in the industry.  
 
Most importantly in relation to the specific quantitatives of this overall study, 
concentration of industry structure into larger firms unconstrained by protection would 
appear to decrease the risk of HPAI (research has shown that large vertically-integrated 
firms tend to have safer production processes e.g. Agrifood Consulting International 
2006) and recommended policy responses aimed at smallholdings reflected this.   
  
The following outlines the sample countries’ protection, structure and HPAI situation: 
Brazil – Brazil has low poultry NRAs and has developed a significant Sector I that 
supplies substantial exports. It also has a medium-large traditional sector but has never 
had HPAI. Given their significant exports, they have taken strong precautionary actions 
in relation to HPAI outbreaks elsewhere (e.g. banning Asian visitors to farms, Asian rice 
for feed and generic stock, as well as heavily monitoring migratory birds but nothing 
specific in relation to the traditional sector). 
 
EU – The EU has high poultry NRAs and many of its members have developed large 
Sector I-systems, though a number still have substantial traditional smaller poultry 
holdings the protection helps maintain. These non-commercial/free range holdings are 
thought to be the source of some HPAI outbreaks, along with wild birds, in some member 
countries (e.g. importers, the UK and Germany). These outbreaks have been controlled 
reasonably well, for example by closing down free-range holdings. General EU 
monitoring is undertaken but true exporting members like the Netherlands would have 
more incentives for precautionary actions. 
 
Thailand – Thailand has low poultry NRAs and is continuing to develop a large Sector I 
that exports to the world. There is a shrinking but still medium-large traditional sector 
and there have been several waves of HPAI. Thailand takes strong actions to maintain its 
export markets, for example following the outbreak of HPAI it transformed a lot of its 
trade from raw to cooked product. 
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US – The US has low poultry NRAs and a very concentrated structure. There have been 
no HPAI outbreaks but incidences of LPAI have led to the US being locked out of some 
markets. It has strong incentives to keep the region free of HPIA. 
 
China – China has low NRAs and is concentrating its poultry sector structure rapidly but 
still has a large traditional sector and HPAI has been endemic. Actions such as 
compulsory vaccination and zero tolerance of imports from pathogenic countries have 
been undertaken and the HPAI situation seems to have improved. 
 
Japan – Japan has very high NRAs and a predominant Sector I driven by a strong self-
sufficiency policy. The OIE reported HPAI incidences in 2008. 
 
Mexico – Mexico has had high NRAs which are trending down. It has developed a 
significant Sector I but still has a substantial traditional sector. It has had no HPAI 
incidences which could be a function of being in the (north) America region and the 
strong incentives for ensuring the region is disease free. 
 
Russia – Russia has high NRAs, driven by a strong goal of self-sufficiency. It has 
developed a significant Sector I but still has a large traditional sector. The OIE reported 
incidences of HPAI in 2008. It has introduced stricter SPS border measures, said to be in 
response to disease outbreaks elsewhere but which would assist self-sufficiency goals. 
 
Ecuador – Ecuador is bringing its poultry sector NRAs down. It does not have as 
significant a Sector I as some of its neighbours such as Brazil and its traditional sector is 
medium-large. There have been no HPAI incidences but this appears a characteristic of 
the region. 
 
Egypt – Egypt has had high NRAs which it is bringing down. Its structure is 
concentrating but it still has a very significant traditional sector with a lot of live trade. 
HPAI has been endemic in recent times. 
 
Indonesia – Indonesia has high NRAs, a consequence of a strong self-sufficiency policy 
based around maintaining a very large traditional sector. HPAI has been endemic and 
resulted in the most recorded human deaths in the world. Some strong actions have been 
taken in response, such as providing incentives for the removal of poultry production 
from Jakarta and more control through caged production. 
 
Vietnam – Vietnam has low NRAs as a consequence of reforms, reinforced through 
WTO accession. Its Sector I is growing strongly but there exists a large traditional sector. 
HPAI has been endemic. 
 
Returning to the scatter plot of NRAs and Structure where countries in bold have had 
HPAI incidences, it can be seen that some exporters have low protection, predominant or 
significant Sector I’s and incentives to be HPAI free (e.g. US and Brazil). However, 
others have substantial traditional sectors and HPAI incidences, though they are 
developing more to Sector I systems and away from HPAI risks (e.g. China and 
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Thailand). Some other developing countries, currently with negligible trade, appear to be 
following these countries’ lead (e.g. Egypt and Vietnam). The importers have high 
NRAs, a consequence of strong self-sufficiency policies, and some have predominantly 
Sector I systems, but few economic incentives to be HPAI free (e.g. EU, Japan and 
Russia which have all had HPAI incidences, and Mexico which has not, probably 
because of regional factors). Indonesia fits this description apart from the predominant 
Sector I systems; its self-sufficiency policies assisting in maintaining a substantial 
traditional sector. The assisted Sector I structure has not been enough to prevent HPAI 
incidences, in part because of the lack of associated incentives to maintain efficient 
export markets. Ecuador, and to a lesser extent perhaps Mexico, fall in between the two 
groupings but there is a trend to lowering NRAs and increasing concentration along the 
lines of the exporters group. 
 
The following are a few preliminary hypotheses building off the above. These could 
evolve as interaction is undertaken with other researchers focusing on the structure and 
disease risk element, and relevant data is brought in for further analysis. Countries that 
seem best able to comply with disease and SPS-measures have simple poultry sector 
structures dominated by Sector I. Low NRA exporters/Sector I’s want to maintain their 
markets so they appear more vigilant in relation to HPAI. This includes those countries 
that have significant outdoor flocks like China (98%) as well as other countries like 
Brazil (20%) and Thailand (33%). The US has had some LPAI outbreaks but these have 
had minimum costs as “true” exporters, including Brazil and Thailand, want to maintain 
exports. Thailand in the past has taken strong actions to maintain its export markets 
against SPS-actions by other countries. The opposite applies for high NRA importers and 
self-sufficiency proponents. In some cases, as with Australian bananas, social-welfare 
would increase with an outbreak of disease that would remove the rationale for banning 
cheaper imports. The EU, apart from the Netherlands and other true exporters, would 
have less to lose from a HPAI outbreak than the larger, efficient exporters. Recent 
outbreaks have been in major EU importers, Germany and the UK. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The focus of the research has been mainly on the influence of support and protection on 
poultry industry structure and also some aspects of disease risk. Some of the collected 
measures are inexact, as evident from the observed differences in South African estimates 
of the same measure of protection under a World Bank project and by the OECD in Table 
A2. These differences point to the need for, at least initial, robust cross-sectional analysis 
of groups of countries with broad differences in support, protection, structure, etc.  
 
The specified hypotheses have been tested with sufficient data being available for an 
appropriate level of analysis to be undertaken. Support and protection data was mainly 
obtained from NRAs measuring adjusted gaps between international and domestic prices 
in World Bank (2006). Structural data took the form of average chickens per holding, 
mainly obtained from agricultural censuses, as well as the predominance of particular 
FAO Sectors I-IV (industrial-traditional). General HPAI incidence information was 
obtained from the OIE website.  
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The quality of the available data may not be sufficient for sophisticated multiple 
regressions/modeling as undertaken in Anderson (2009) between NRAs, revealed 
comparative advantage etc. However, it has been sufficient for more robust analysis that 
addresses the research questions and could point the way for more detailed data 
collection, including case studies, and then modeling. These research questions 
concerned the relationship between support, protection, trade, investment, structure and 
spread of infectious diseases. Support and protection constrains efficient trade, 
encourages smuggling/informal trade etc, diminishing the incentives for good 
management and leading to greater disease risk. It also constrains efficient investment 
which could lead to greater disease risk through weaker SPS, research and other relevant 
institutions. Protection can also constrain structural change, hindering development of 
efficient Sector I production systems, or maintaining larger traditional sector, and can 
result in greater disease risks. 
 
Figure 2 illustrated that the “true” exporters tended to have low NRAs and that the “true” 
importers tended to have high NRAs. Countries with negligible trade mainly had low 
NRAs apart from (developing) Indonesia and (developed) Korea with their strong self-
sufficiency policies.  
 
In terms of structure, all countries were experiencing a concentration with relative growth 
in industrial Sector I holdings. The NRA and structure scatter plot illustrated that the 
“true” exporters and “true” importers fell into two groups; low NRAs, a mix of structures, 
more market incentives and lower HPAI incidences, and high NRAs, a mix of structures, 
lower market incentives and higher HPAI incidences (HPAI experiences also appeared to 
be regionally based) respectively.  
 
A clear conclusion is that support and protection do not determine structure – some 
countries had strong enough political economy objectives to be willing to pay the high 
cost of over-riding open market forces on their structures. However, support and 
protection did determine whether structures were distorted and not economically 
efficient. Technically efficient developed structures in conjunction with (export) market 
incentives driving economic efficiency and encouraging better risk management, appear 
to positively impact on HPAI risk. High protection levels hinder open markets’ role in the 
demise of inefficient, poorly managed productions systems, whether they be traditional 
sectors or not. Sector support and protection where there is no efficient export motivation 
may protect small (e.g. Indonesia) or large (e.g. Russia) scale producers but in the longer-
term, inefficient production and the lack of market incentives creates greater risk of 
disease. 
 
To further analyse the broader relationship between support and protection, and impeded 
prevention and control of contagious diseases, would require appropriate measures of the 
latter aspect such as deaths, incidence of outbreaks, cullings, breadth/length of control 
etc.  
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Table A1: Countries within required trade categories in PSE and NRA databases 
 
World Bank NRAs  OECD PSEs  
Strong Exporters 
Brazil (1)   Brazil (1) 
Chile (9) (no poultry detail)    
Thailand (5) 
US (2) (L3)   US (2) (L3) 
EU15 (3) (L1)   EU(15) (3) (L1) 
Poland (L8) 
Hungary (L6) 
 
Strong Importers 
Cameroon (no poultry detail) 
Cote D’Ivoire (no poultry detail)       
Mozambique (no poultry detail)   
South Africa (9)  South Africa (9) 
Mexico (6)   Mexico (6) 
Japan (2)   Japan (2) 
China (Taiwan)   
Russian Federation (1) (L9) Russian Federation (1) (L9) 
Tajikistan (no poultry detail)   
Ukraine (L9)   Ukraine (L9) 
Romania   Romania 
    Switzerland 
 
Negligible Exports and Imports 
Egypt (no poultry detail) 
Ethiopia (no poultry detail)    
Kenya (no poultry detail)     
Madagascar (no poultry detail)    
Nigeria (no poultry detail)     
Senegal (no poultry detail)    
Sudan (no poultry detail)     
Tanzania (no poultry detail)    
Uganda (no poultry detail)    
Zambia (no poultry detail)    
Ecuador    
Bangladesh (no poultry detail)    
India (no poultry detail)  
Indonesia    
Korea, Dem.   Korea, Dem. 
Malaysia (no poultry detail)    
Pakistan (no poultry detail) 
Vietnam    
    Norway  
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Table A2: Poultry NRAs for selective countries 1994-2003 
 
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Exporters              
Brazil -21 -11 0 2 4 -7 6 -1 6 4 1 2 2 
EU15   129 77 55 51 90 57 52 56 54 101 69 
- Austria 65 71 129 77 55 51 90 57 52 56 54 101 69 
- Denmark 110 114 129 77 55 51 90 57 52 56 54 101 69 
- France 6 23 129 77 55 51 90 57 52 56 54 101 69 
- Finland 110 114 129 77 55 51 90 57 52 56 54 101 69 
- Germany 110 114 129 77 55 51 90 57 52 56 54 101 69 
- Ireland 110 114 129 77 55 51 90 57 52 56 54 101 69 
- Italy 110 114 129 77 55 51 90 57 52 56 54 101 69 
- Net’lands 110 114 129 77 55 51 90 57 52 56 54 101 69 
- Portugal 110 114 129 77 55 51 90 57 52 56 54 101 69 
- Spain 110 114 129 77 55 51 90 57 52 56 54 101 69 
- Sweden 13 11 129 77 55 51 90 57 52 56 54 101 69 
- UK 110 114 129 77 55 51 90 57 52 56 54 101 69 
Hungary 28.8 37.3 32.8 33.1 32.4 39.2 28.4 37.5 48.2 60.7 50.9 Na Na 
Poland 32.9 65.6 48.1 54.2 32.4 40.7 29.8 11.9 9.2 10.1 1.6 Na Na 
Thailand -10 -11   17 18   8 23 23 21   15   33 13 Na Na 
US 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
              
Importers              
China -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Japan 44 37 31 36 32 39 60 108 73 71 73 45 Na 
Mexico 103 90 10 10 28 24 16 55 42 72 42 27 Na 
Romania 22.1 57.4 40.3 31.4 32.7 101 55.9 45.4 130 192 146.4 167 50.9 
Russia -9 27 49 55 71 31 12 51 110 73 46 79 114 
Sth. Africa 20 13.7 15.5 19.6 21.0 3.6 4.9 -1.6 -14.9 -10.0 20.4 20 22 
“ (OECD) Na   8.0 15.9   8.6 21.1 0.0 0.0  0.0    0.0    0.0   0.0 Na Na 
Taiwan 168 178 167 167 195 242 372 347 254 237 Na Na Na 
Ukraine -48.4 6.0 -14.9 -1.4 45.4 69.9 0.2 53.1 43.9 93.8 66.2 58.9 95.3 
              
Negligible              
Ecuador 15 24 43 41 38 24 -4 9 29 90 -30 Na Na 
Egypt -19.2 2.5 16.8 12.7 17.2 19.9 15.1 18.4 -2.9 -12.7 -27.0 -35.2 -24.7 
Indonesia 86.2 102.9 102.1 136.2 70.9 -8.9 139.2 107.5 70.4 120.2 101.2 Na Na 
Korea 165 198 171 185 161 135 206 220 201 164 131 180 Na 
Vietnam -4 -4 -4 5 5 6 6 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 
Notes:  
Individual EU member values are available up to 2007. 
South Africa (OECD) consists of NRAs derived from OECD PSE estimates which are 
broadly consistent in terms of trend and turning points apart from 2000 and 2003, the 
latter being put down to an imperfect pass-through of a currency appreciation to domestic 
wholesale prices. Differences are mainly put down to different international reference 
prices and the OECD not estimating negative NRAs. 
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Table A3: Heads of poultry inventory per holding 
 
Country Head Holdings Head/ 
Holding 
Comments 
Brazil  718,500,000 
 
3,200,000 225 1996 census. Large Sector I and larger 
traditional sector. 
EU  937,260,000 
 
 
1,081,200 
 
 
867 
 
 
2005 Eurostat. Predominantly Sector I 
though some large traditional sectors in 
some “Below EU median” members. 
- Austria 11,310,000 63,600 178 Below EU median 
- Denmark 17,030,000 3,560 4,784 Above EU median 
- Finland 10,020,000 1,760 5,693 “ 
- France 202,570,000 210,790 961 Below EU median 
- Germany 107,260,000 88,690 1,209 Above EU median 
- Ireland 10,540,000 9,620 1,096 Below EU median 
- Italy 126,510,000 110,150 1,149 “  
- Netherlands 92,920,000 2,860 32,490 Above EU median.  
- Portugal 27,400,000 296,710 92 Below EU median 
- Spain 156,950,000 250,300 627 “ 
- Sweden 14,260,000 5,260 2,711 Above EU median 
- UK 160,490,000 37,900 4,235 “ 
Thailand         95,172,590 
 
 
  3,249,177 
 
 
         241 
 
 
2003 FAO estimate of stocks and 
Narrod et al 2007 holdings. Large 
Sector I and larger traditional sector. 
US  1,732,714,202 136,252 12,717 2002 census. Predominantly Sector 1. 
   
China  5,330,000,000 
 
75,820,000 70 Ke et al 2005 estimates. Large Sector I 
and much larger traditional sector. 
Japan  3,576,312 8,302 431 2000 census. Predominantly Sector 1. 
Mexico  232,600,000 
 
33,62,919 69 1991 census. Large Sector I and 
traditional sector. 
Russia  112,000,000 
 
 
607,000 
 
 
185 
 
 
2004 – 1/1000 of GAIN 2008 chicken 
and OECD 2007 poultry meat 
agricultural enterprises (Sector 1) 
   
Ecuador  28,767,251 
 
584,762 49 1999/2000 census. Sector I and larger 
traditional sector. 
Egypt  62,040,389 
 
3,765,009 16 1999/2000 census. Very large 
traditional sector. 
Indonesia  872,416,000 
 
 
3,206 
 
63 
 
BPS 2004 (Sector 1) estimate does not 
cover large traditional sector so 
Thailand 1998 used as a proxy. 
Vietnam  152,200,000 
 
 
8,400,000 
 
 
32 
 
 
Agrifood Consulting International 2006 
estimate for 2004. Large Sector I but 
larger traditional sector. 
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Appendix: Determination of countries structural averages 
 
Brazil 
Brazil’s poultry industry is becoming increasingly highly concentrated and its export 
market dominated by only a few large companies. Comprehensive statistics on changes in 
the distribution of livestock farms by size in Brazil are not available. Brazil’s Agricultural 
Censuses provide a time series of data but only on the farming sector as a whole in terms 
of farm area sizes and only aggregate figures on poultry for 1996.  
There is some information on the increasing concentration in the chicken production size 
distribution between 1985 and 1996; the proportion of chicken farms with less than 
10,000 (greater than 10,000) chickens declining (increasing) from 58% (42%) in 1985 to 
22% (78%) in 1996 (Delgado et al 2003). If this trend continued there would be few 
farms left with less than 10,000 chickens by now, in fact a 2001 survey had no sample 
farms of less than 10,000 chickens in the main producing region (Delgado et al 2003). 
Poultry production has continued to trend upwards since 1996; increasing by over 100% 
from 4.052m t in 1996 to 9.297m t in 2005.  
The total number of chickens and chicken holdings in 1996 is available from the 
Agricultural Census on the FAO website which gives an average chickens per holding of 
718.5m/3.2m = 224.5 (Table A3). This also would have increased since 1996, at least 
around the 300 mark, as inventories have increased by 2.7% p.a. over 1981-2006 whilst 
the industry has become more concentrated (Upton 2007).  
 
EU  
Austria 
Livestock tables for 1990, 1999 and 2005 with chicken numbers and holdings were 
available from the FAO website; 2005 from a related web-link and the others directly 
from census summaries. The most recent figures were available for all EU members from 
a Eurostat data base and are presented first for all members: 
‘05 Chickens holdings 63,600 head 11,310,000 Av. = 178 (Table A3) 
FAO linked website: 
‘05 Chickens holdings 64,000 head 11,340,000 Av. = 177 
‘99 “  “    81,000 “       13,654,000  
FAO listed census: 
‘99/00 Broilers  holdings 2,150 head 7,010,000} Combined av. = 163 
“ Laying hens “   79,700  “       6,630,000}   
‘90  Chickens “   -   “     12,218,046  
The estimates show a continuing concentration into predominantly Sector I production. 
 
Denmark 
‘05 Chickens  holdings 3,560 head 17,030,000 Av.=4,784 (Table A3) 
FAO linked webpage: 
‘07 Chickens for slaughtering holdings 286 head 11,758,204 Av = 41,100 
‘06 “    “    230 “       12,924,281 Av = 56,000 
FAO listed census: 
‘99/00  Broilers  holdings 460    head 14,920,000} Combined av. = 2,918 
“ Laying hens  “          6,370   “         5,010,000}  
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‘89  Chickens  “        13,858   “       16,266,298 
 
Finland 
‘05 Chickens holdings 1,760 head 10,020,000 Av.=5,693 (Table A3) 
FAO listed census: 
‘99/00  Broilers  holdings 220   head 7,920,000} Combined av. = 5,116  
“ Laying hens  “          2,190   “       4,410,000}  
‘90  Chickens  “ -  “       9,520,018 
 
France 
‘05 Chickens holdings 210,790 head 202,570,000 Av. = 961 (Table A3) 
FAO listed census: 
‘99/00  Broilers  holdings 125,630  head 126,300,000} Combined av. = 569  
“ Laying hens  “    231,820  “         77,070,000}   
‘88  Chickens  “    -      “       130,830,722 
 
Germany 
‘05 Chickens holdings 88,690 head 107,260,000 Av. 1,209 (Table A3) 
FAO linked webpage: 
Table chicken holdings in 2005 and 2007 were 80,400 and 75,800 respectively, and 
chicken numbers 107.3m and 114.6m respectively, suggesting averages of approximately 
1,340-1,520 and further concentration into Sector I.  
FAO listed census: 
‘99/00  Broilers  holdings 115,120  head 58,330,000} Combined av. = 530 
“ Laying hens  “      15,460    “       10,640,000}  
‘95  Poultry  “    187,900  “       96,000,000 
 
Ireland 
‘05 Chickens holdings 9,620 head 10,540,000 Av.=1,096 (Table A3) 
FAO listed census: 
‘99/00  Broilers  holdings 1,350  head 10,800,000} Combined av. = 1,231 
“ Laying hens  “    8,990  “         1,930,000}  
‘91  Poultry  “    -  “       12,052,800 
 
Italy 
‘05 Chickens holdings 110,150 head 126,510,000 Av.=1,149 (Table A3) 
FAO listed census: 
2000  Broilers  holdings 300,568  head 96,708,718} Combined av. = 181  
“ Laying hens  “    479,420  “       44,781,166} (this figure is  
‘90  Chickens “     -     “     142,100,216 suspiciously low) 
 
Netherlands 
‘05 Chickens holdings 2,860 head 92,920,000 Av.=34,490(TableA3) 
FAO linked webpage: 
Tables were available of broiler holdings, head and production 1975-2007: 
‘07 Broilers holdings   748  head 43,352,000 Av. = 58,000  
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‘06 “  “      674  “       41,914,000 Av. = 60,200 
FAO listed census: 
‘99/00  Broilers  holdings 1,230  head 53,250,000} Combined av. = 25,005  
“ Laying hens  “    2,960  “       51,520,000} 
‘89  Chickens  “    -   “       89,777,520 
 
Portugal 
‘05 Chickens holdings 296, 710 head 27,400,000 Av. = 92 (Table A3) 
FAO listed census: 
‘99  Chicken(meat) holdings 162,687  head 25,928,167} Combined av. = 95 
“ Laying hens  “    235,276  “       11,980,332}  
‘89  Chickens  “    -   “   415,852 
 
Spain 
‘05 Chickens holdings 250,300 head 156,950,000 Av. = 627 (Table A3) 
FAO listed census: 
‘99  Poultry  holdings 329,020  head 182,446,000 Av. = 555 
‘89  Chickens  “    -     “       109,972,000  
 
Sweden 
‘05 Chickens holdings 5,210 head 14,260,000 Av.=2,711 (Table A3) 
FAO listed census: 
‘99/00  Broilers  holdings 90  head 5,860,000} Combined av. = 2,052 
“ Laying hens  “        6,590     “       7,850,000}  
 
UK 
‘05 Chickens holding 37,900 head 160,490,000 Av.=4,235 (Table A3) 
There is some confusing data due to changes to what represents broiler holdings from 
1997. It was stated there were 200 holdings with greater than 100,000 birds in 1995 and 
by 2005 that this had doubled to 400 who produced 69% of production. 
The Poultry Site: 
‘05  Broilers holdings 3,100 head 111,500,000} Combined av. = 3,800 
“ Layers  “  37,400  “         40,966,800}   
FAO listed census 
‘99/00 Broilers holdings 1,970 head 105,300,000} Combined av. = 5,771 
“ Laying hens  “           27,080  “         47,810,000}  
 
Thailand 
Thailand’s poultry sector is concentrating and quite comprehensive statistics are available 
that measure this as demonstrated in the following table: 
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 % share in no. of chickens % share in no. of holdings 
Flock no. 1978 1988 1993 1998 1978 1988 1993 1998 2003 
1-19       9.15   10.15 69.30 69.77 64.24 61.35 35.3 
20-99     16.91   20.15 30.00 29.11 33.00 36.09 57.1 
100-499       4.80     4.96   0.53  {0.84   2.03   1.99 {6.8 
500-999       1.54     1.00   0.05  {    0.15   0.08 {  
1000-9999     29.11   31.16   0.09  {0.28   0.50   0.42   1.4 
10000+     38.49   32.58   0.03  {    0.09   0.06   0.4 
Total (m) 54.157 86.679 154.922 169.102   2.638   3.249   2.617   3.174   1.028 
 Source: Narrod et al (2007) and Delgado et al (2003) 
 
A measure of concentration could be the percentage of “production” divided by the 
percentage of larger farms that deliver it (e.g. 38.49/0.09 = 428 in 1993 and 32.58/0.06 = 
543 in 1998 – a trend of 5.4% p.a. Corresponding structure averages are 154.9/2.6 = 60 
chickens/holding and 169.1/3.2 = 63 – a trend in this non-comparable concentration 
measure of 1% p.a. Using FAO 2003 stocks gives an average 241.1/1.0 = 241 (Table A3) 
FAO listed census: 
‘88 Chicken holdings 3,249,177 head 95,172,590 Average = 29  
The 2003 average of 241 is over 8 times this, reflecting increasing concentration. 
 
United States 
Poultry industry concentration is probably most advanced in the US but, somewhat 
surprisingly, statistics on this development are hard to find and obtain, despite requests of 
USDA. It was not until 2007 that the Agricultural Resource Management Survey 
included a broiler version. From Agricultural Census information, farms with chickens 
have continually declined from a very high 87.7% in 1910 to 5.6% in 1992, whilst 
receipts have increased from $127m to $9,176m over the same period.  
Census information from the FAO site had 35,500 broiler holdings with 1,214m broilers 
in 1997. Comparable figures are available on layers that can be combined to determine a 
structural average. In terms of numbers sold, there were 27,737 farms selling 7,367m 
head in 1997 (7,367,000/28 = 263,000) compared to 32,000 selling 8,500m head in 2002 
(8,500,000/32 = 266,000), and with the largest holdings of 750,000 or more broilers 
increasing from 1,407 to 2,211 over the period (a more detailed distribution is available).  
Farms with gross sales of $100,000 or less were 54% of poultry farms in 1995 but 
produced just 12% of the value of production whilst the top 3% with sales of $1m or 
more accounted for around a third of the value. There is other information available on 
changes over time, for example medium farms that produced 605,000 birds in 2006 were 
producing 520,000 birds in 2002 and 300,000 birds in 1987 (Hoppe et al 2007). Family 
farms with at least $500,000 in production value held 75.2% of poultry and egg 
production in 2003, up from 48.3% in 1989 (MacDonald et al 2006). If this trend has 
continued then these larger farms are probably producing between 80-90% of the value of 
production. The following census figures illustrate a similar strong concentration trend. 
FAO listed census: 
‘02 Broilers holdings 37,937 Head 1,398,279,047} Combined av.=12,717 
“ Layers  “   98,315 “ 334,435,155} (Table A3) 
‘87 Chicken  “ 144,438  “ 375,577,186 Av. = 2,600 
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China 
China’s poultry sector has developed rapidly in recent decades. Inventory increased from 
1.98b birds to 5.33b birds between 1985 and 2005 (Ke Bingsheng et al 2007). Farm 
numbers in 2005 were 34.6m broiler farms and 41.2m layer farms, mainly small and 
down from 104.1m in 1996 (producing 3,094m birds). The average number of chicken 
per holding was 70 in 2005, over double that in 1996 (Table A3). The number and share 
of large producers increased (producers with an annual output of greater than 10,000 
birds increased from a share of 25% in 1996 to 49% in 2005). There is still a dichotomy 
of small and large producers in Chinese poultry. Poultry output and meat production has 
increased even more over this period, in the latter case from 1.60m t to 14.64m t. The 
1996 Agricultural Census provides the earliest detail on the Chinese poultry production 
structure, but there are no chicken details in the FAO website listed entry.    
 
Japan 
MAFF provided detailed statistics on the number of farm households raising broilers by 
size of shipment (per year) as summarized in the following table which shows falling 
number of holdings, concentrating in the largest size, and falling or static shipments: 
 
No. of households raising broilers by size of shipment (‘000) Year 
Total <50 50 to <100 100 to <300 >300 
No. of broilers 
shipped (‘000) 
1995 4,328 1,393 785 1,838 312 606,494 
2000 3,502 963 677 1,512 340 569,234 
2004 3,240 777 614 1,052 410 589,957 
2005 3,120 673 572 1,049 404 606,898 
 
Some Agricultural Census figures were also available from the FAO website and for 
2000 this had lower broiler holdings at 2,721 and the following total chicken numbers. 
FAO listed census: 
2000 Chickens holdings 8,302 head 3,576,312 Av. = 431 (Table A3). 
 
Mexico 
The 2008 GAIN Report MX8057 provided some distributional information over time by 
size of chicken farm companies which shows a strong concentration trend: 
 
 Companies Percentage of production 
Size/Year 1996 2007 1996 2007 
Large     2     3 33 56 
Medium   27   28 40 40 
Small 181 150 27   4 
   
The Report stated 255,933,839 broilers per cycle were produced which if achieved by the 
above 181 farms provides an average of 1.4m chickens per holding. Live chicken sales 
are significant but trending downwards, from 31% to 26% between 2001 and 2007. 
Correspondingly, supermarket sales increased, from 5% to 7% over 2007. The FAO 
census figures are dominated by small holdings.  
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FAO listed census: 
‘91 poultry  holdings 3,362,919 head 232.6m Average = 69 (Table A3) 
 
Russia 
Statistics on the Russian poultry industry structure are hard to find, one reason being the 
recent major changes with the transition towards a more commercial sector. GAIN 
Reports contain some relevant information, mainly on poultry meat production over time 
and split between agricultural enterprises and private households. However, it is difficult 
to align these changes with those in holding numbers. In the Structures section of the 
Russia chapter in OECD (2007) it is described how the three types of producers 
(agricultural enterprises (organizations), household plots, and family (“peasant”) farms) 
have changed over time. Measured livestock output in 2005 is produced only by 
enterprises (45%) and households (55%), with the latter produced primarily for self-
consumption and of much less importance in marketed production. Amongst the 
enterprises, a group of successfully developing, investing and modernizing producers is 
emerging. Similarly, some households are rapidly evolving into small-scale commercial 
producers, doubling their supplies of fresh meat for retailing and processing over 2000-
05. OECD (2007) had poultry meat enterprises at 607 in 2004 when the GAIN report 
(RS7019) had them producing 1.1m t or 79% of Russian poultry meat. However, a World 
Poultry article had 166 enterprises in 2002 producing 1.4m t or 59% of production 
whereas the 2008 GAIN report had agricultural enterprises producing only 0.7m t in 
2002. These sets of figures are incompatible and cannot be used to determine trends. An 
average number of broilers per holding of 184,514 was obtained for 2004 by adjusting 
the 2008 GAIN estimate of 280m chickens for the 15% annual growth rate and dividing 
by the 607 poultry meat agricultural enterprises estimated by the OECD for 2004. The 
2008 chicken numbers estimate excluded household birds which are significant given a 
binomial industry structure and inflates the estimate. A background paper for the last 
Russian agricultural census stated there were approximately 25,000 large and medium 
agricultural organizations, 8,000 small enterprises, 264,000 private (peasant) farms, 
16,000,000 private household farms, 14,600,000 families that have collectives and 
individual kitchen gardens, and 5,000,000 families that have plots for individual 
construction, and other agricultural producers. These numbers total to around 36,000,000 
with only 33,000 being in the first two “enterprise” groups suggesting the earlier 
structural average should be adjusted to one thousandth of its value, or 185 (Table A3) 
 
Ecuador 
FAO listed census: 
‘99/00 Chickens (courtyard) holdings 582,492 head 9,172,193} Combined av. = 49 
“ Broilers (intensive)  “        2,270 “     19,595,058} (Table A3) 
This should be seen as a lower bound as much larger estimates of the number of chickens 
were presented in agribusiness publications on the associated website provided with the 
FAO census figures (e.g. four fold figures of 83.7m birds for fat and 3.4m hens in 1997). 
 
Egypt 
Household poultry in 2004/05 had holdings of 3,829,769 and 68,452,380 head. Overall 
backyard production numbers are not well known but have been estimated at between 
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200-250m. Other information from FAO material included that over 1991-2005; broilers 
farms went from 13,356 to 14,698 holdings and actual capacity from 140,676,000 to 
491,231,000 chickens (broilers have 4-5 cycles per year). Estimates of overall production 
have been as high as 900m. With layers, farms went from 1,336 to 1,728 over 1992-2005 
and actual capacity from 2,931,000 to 20,670,000 chickens. FAOSTAT estimated poultry 
numbers of 89m in 2000 and 95m in 2006. Farm numbers in 2004 were given as 19,637. 
This is a confusion of figures – the FAO website census figures appear to be associated 
with households and would miss the more dynamic commercial holdings which are 
important in terms of the overall structure and its influence on disease risk, though the 
large backyard production could have more influence. The following chickens per 
holding estimate should be considered a lower bound.  
FAO listed census: 
‘99/00 Poultry holding 3,765,009 head 62,040,389 Av. = 16 (Table A3) 
‘90 “  “  2,872,580 “       78,255,296 
 
Indonesia 
A 2007 GAIN Report (ID7035) had Indonesia’s broiler population at 889m birds in 2007, 
with estimated production of 824,000t, and is expected to increase slightly to 899m birds 
in 2008. Poultry (including ducks) inventories increased from 1,207m in 2005 to 1,225m 
in 2006, to 1,250m in 2007, and is estimated to be 1,275m in 2008. Corresponding 
production figures were 1.147m t, 1.180m t, 1.215m t and 1.250m t.  
Indonesian Agricultural Census figures off the FAO website had only the number of head 
of chicken at a low 102m in 1993. The website associated with this Indonesian entry 
provided a time series of data on broiler establishments and populations from Statistics 
Indonesia which is laid out in the following table: 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Native pop. (m)    259   268    275    277    277 287 
Layer pop. (m)      69.4     70.3      78.0      79.2      93.4   98.5 
Broiler pop. (m)    531    622    865    848    779 864 
Layer establishment 1,397 1,601 1,275 1,377 1,768 na 
Broiler establishment     834 1,095    956 1,040 1,438 na 
 
The broiler populations are of the same order as those given in the 2007 GAIN Report. In 
2004, the total number of layer and broiler holdings was 3,206 and the total population of 
associated chickens 872.4m, giving an unrealistic average chickens per holding of 
272,120. What is missing in the substantial number of backyard producers often 
associated with native chickens that would bring this average down substantially, 
providing a better reflection of an industry with a significant commercial sector but a 
more substantial, in terms of holding numbers, backyard sector.  
The next table, produced in Hall et al (2006) from CASERED (2004) and MoA (2005), 
gives information on the size of Sector III and IV. It can be seen the backyard sector 
dominates in terms of numbers of birds and if Indonesia was like the more developed 
Thailand industry, based on the over 500 birds per holding averages of the Sectors I and 
II farms, 95% of holdings at least would be in Sectors III and IV, suggesting the earlier 
average should be closer to Thailand’s 1998 average of 63 (Table A3). 
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System Centres No. of farms Birds (m) 
Commercial integrated (Sector I) - Broiler 354 13,520     3.00 
“  - Layer  128   2,418     6.70 
Commercial (Sector II) – Broiler  45,934   38.30 
“ – Layer  37,707   19.90 
Other (Sector III)     32.39 
Backyard (Sector IV)   175.00 
Total   275.29 
 
Vietnam 
The Vietnam Agricultural Census figures off the FAO website had just poultry 
population numbers in 1994 at 93m. There was no associated website with the Vietnam 
entries but a FAO report by Agrifood Consulting International (2006) had the number of 
chickens at 159.2m in 2004. Vietnam poultry is mainly, in terms of holdings, backyard 
flocks with an average size prior to the HPAI outbreaks at around 16 birds (4 hens, 1 
cock, 11 growers and chicks). Only 1% of flocks consist of over 100 birds (FAO). Hong 
Hahn et al (2007), stated, drawing on DLP (2006), that there were more than 7.9m 
households engaged in traditional extensive poultry production with an average flock of 
32 birds and representing 94% of all producers, suggesting a total of 8.4m holdings. This 
is the same number as given in Agrifood Consulting International (2006) report which 
had the number of chickens at 159.2m, giving an average of chickens per holding of 
around 20. It would be expected that the inclusion of commercial producers would raise 
the average from the 32 chickens per holding given above so this higher number could be 
used instead, though in terms of reflecting the structure, 20 versus 32 makes little 
difference (Table A3). In 2005, 70-75% of Vietnam’s total chicken population was raised 
under the traditional system but in 2006 this had fallen to slightly above 60%. 
The following table in Hall et al (2006) and from Delquigny et al (2004) gives some 
information on the distribution of poultry holdings; the large number of family holdings 
with a relatively low percentage of production and a significant industrial sector: 
 
System  
Characteristics Family Semi-industrial Industrial 
No. of producers 13,000,000 5,000 2,000 
Av. Flock size <500 1-3 groups of 500 to 
2,000 birds/year 
>2,000 
% production 65% 10-15% 20-25% 
System details Sector IV  Includes state farms 
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